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Dedication:
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Gramm, Schnell, Wilhite, and Card, my friends Juan and Joseph, and to any other individuals
who at any time endured my incessant rambling while completing the project in addition to the
insight and support they have given me in the past four years.
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Abstract
In ECN 499, “agent-based models” (hereinafter referred to as ABMs) are the primary
focus of the course. An ABM is a model wherein agents, or individuals, are given various
attributes and abilities whereupon they are placed into a defined world to interact based upon
these attributes and abilities. An ABM is useful to study phenomena in a simple, abstract
manner, and they allow for greater flexibility with respect to the framework within which the
model is defined.
This project write-up summarizes the conceptualization, construction, and
implementation of an ABM using NetLogo, an open-source GUI-based program which is
primarily suited for building models using simple syntax and assets included with the program.
Specifically, the author creates three separate models to simulate the process of organ donation.
Since laboratory experiments or random controlled trials are difficult or infeasible with respect to
organ donations, ABMs are an ideal alternative to investigate the effects of changing the
donation process. While the models do not exhibit significant differences in organ allocation, the
author nonetheless gains invaluable experience with building models and proposing a research
question.
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Introduction
In the United States of America, over 130 million adults are registered organ donors
(U.S. Department of Health & Human Services). Meanwhile, twenty people die each day waiting
for a transplant, and over 116 thousand populate the national transplant waiting list as of August
2017 (U.S. Department of Health & Human Services). While this disparity in interested donors
and waiting recipients may be explained due to factors such as the transport and preservation of
organs, blood type compatibility, and others, the number above nevertheless piqued the interest
of the author. As an aspiring economist, I am interested in analyzing institutions and systems to
see whether they produce efficient or optimal outcomes, and organ donations appear to be an
area where improvements may be made.
However, I cannot gather groups of donors and individuals needing organs, hand out
money to the recipients, and have the donors auction off their organs to see what happens.
Fortunately, agent-based models provide an alternative to the logistical and ethical challenges of
a real-world experiment with organ donations. Over the past several months, I have
conceptualized, constructed, and implemented three distinct models of organ donations that seek
to illustrate the results of introducing different rules and procedures to the process of receiving a
transplant.
This paper summarizes the process of creating the models, the issues that appeared during
the process, and an assessment of the overall quality of the models.
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Conceptualizing the Models
As discussed in the introduction, the organ donation system has gathered my interest and
is the focus of my models. Before I began coding, however, I dedicated time and effort to
learning more about the procedures and definitions that comprise the donation system.
Otherwise, I would be attempting to create agents and interactions that may or may not reflect
reality in any way whatsoever. Once the preliminary research was complete, I began the
“bottom-up” approach to creating an ABM. In other words, I focused on what defines an agent,
what defines an interaction, and what defines the world within which the agents interact. From
there, the global attributes of the models may be more clearly defined and recorded.
The Waiting List
According to the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN), over 80
percent of the waiting list candidates are waiting for kidneys; furthermore, a large majority of
donors are deceased at the time of transplantation (Health Resources and Services
Administration, “Organ Donation Statistics,” 2018). Furthermore, the OPTN lists “waiting time,
immune system incompatibility, pediatric status, distance to donor’s hospital, and survival
benefit” in addition to blood type compatibility as determinants of the allocation of a kidney
(ibid, “How Organ Allocation Works,” 2016). Specifically, an Estimated Post-Transplant
Survival (EPTS) score is assigned to all adult patients on the kidney waitlist to determine the
likelihood of survival; a lower EPTS score means a patient is more likely to survive, and
therefore, low scoring patients receive “increased priority” over individuals with higher scores
who have been waiting a similar amount of time (ibid, 2014).
This information provided several insights with respect to formulating my models. First, I
should focus on one organ (e.g. kidneys) in my model, but include different “blood types” to
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reflect compatibility issues. Secondly, my donors should only be able to donate once; since most
actual donors are deceased, there are limitations to how many times they may donate. Third, the
“viability” of a donor and/or recipient is clearly a consideration of the organ donation system,
and therefore, my agents need to be assigned a measure of their viability for donation. Finally,
due to the differentiating factors, I need to be able to deliver a list of agents compatible with a
donor so that the model doesn’t allocate organs to individuals that would not accept the organ in
reality.
A Market Approach
With the above information, I may create a simplified simulation of the organ donation
system as-is. However, I am also interested in simulating a “market” to allocate organs. While
this is currently illegal in the United States, 1 I sought to investigate the effects of allowing the
selling of organs to see if outcomes for recipients changed in in any significant manner.
Therefore, my agents must additionally possess money for exchange, a method of evaluating the
value of an organ relative to the money, and a method to determine whether to make an
exchange.
Donors’ Valuation of Organs
Most of the challenges I faced during the project were concerned with the market-based
simulations of the organ network. Since there is no such (legal) market in existence, I had to
apply my own reasoning to determine how valuations and exchanges would occur. This leads to
a few pressing questions about humanity. For instance, would donors consider the viability of

1

The National Organ Transplant Act, introduced by Orrin Hatch in 1983 and passed in 1984,

“prohibits the purchase or sale of human organs if such transfer affects interstate commerce.”
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their recipient when selling an organ, or would they exclusively consider the money that could be
made by selling the organ? This question compelled me to form two separate market models,
each exploring one side or the other. In one model, only money matters. In the other, the amount
of money resulting from selling an organ is weighted by the probability that the recipient
survives the transplantation. This will be detailed later in the manuscript.
Recipients’ Valuation of Organs
Just as donors’ behavior perplexed me, so too, did the motivations of the recipients in a
market environment. I ultimately propose that recipients would exhibit a positive relationship
between their expected time remaining to live without a transplant and the amount of money that
they would offer for a transplant. In other words, as time passes, a recipient would offer a larger
share of their money to receive an organ and eventually offer their entire amount of wealth to
survive. However, there may be individuals who would, after some time, realize that their
chances are waning, and thereby give up the search to allocate their wealth to heirs instead.
Furthermore, there may be those who reverse the relationship between time waiting and the
amount of money offered: their rationale would lead them to the conclusion that the sooner they
receive an organ, the better the outcome, and therefore, they would offer a premium for
minimizing the amount of time waiting for a donation.
These conflicting motivations interested my advisor, but we ultimately decided that most
recipients would likely exhibit the positive relationship, and therefore, the other cases aren’t
considered in the models. What remained, then, was the mechanism for selling the organs. I
opted for a simple auction wherein the donor obtains a list of compatible recipients and sells to
that recipient who offers the best bid.
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Creating the Models
With all the properties of the organ donation system in mind, including my proposed
properties of a market system, I began the process of choosing a programming language in which
to implement the models. For the ECN 499 course, we used NetLogo, 2 an open-source language
with visual assets and a focus upon ABMs, to create sample models early in the course. The
syntax of NetLogo was quite simple compared to C and C++, and it handles many of the more
complex data structure components of a model on its own, meaning it was ideal for my
intentions. Despite never working with NetLogo previously, I quickly acclimated myself with the
rules and procedures that govern how the code is compiled and set out to create my models.
General Properties of the Models
While the methods of organ allocation would differ with each model, most components
would be identical or similar between the models. For instance, all models run in a torus-shaped
world comprised of a grid. Each square on the grid represents an agent, and adjacent squares are
considered “neighbors.” Time is represented discretely by “ticks.” I will now detail the variables
and procedures that define the agents and initiation of the simulations.
Agents
In my organ donation model, there are ultimately six types of agents that may populate
the world at any time. In the beginning, there are three primary types: “donors,” “recipients,” and

2

Northwestern University hosts a website dedicated to NetLogo which includes downloads of

the software and other resources. The author highly suggests viewing some of the sample models
at <https://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/>.
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“potential donors.” As the simulation progresses, one may observe “post-donors,” “postrecipients,” and “deceased recipients.”
The primary agents are assigned a uniformly randomly distributed value, denoted
organtype in the code, that reflects the different compatibility types of an organ. Each agent is
also assigned a value denoted viability which seeks to mimic the purpose of an EPTS score
(except in this case, a higher viability value reflects a higher probability of survival after a
transplant or a higher quality organ for recipients and donors, respectively). The viability value is
normally distributed with a mean and standard deviation each determined by a slider comprised
of incremented values.
Beyond these variables, there are several other variables that function as status indicators
and therefore determine the type of agent a given grid square can be. Specifically, one may refer
to Table 1 for a summary of the variables.
VARIABLE

DESCRIPTION

ACTIVE

1 if seeking donation/recipient; 0 if not donating; -1 if donated,
received, or deceased

RECRUIT

1 if donating; 0 otherwise

MATCH

1 if matched, 0 otherwise

PARTNER

Reports the identity of an agent’s match

COOLDOWN

1 if received an organ during the last tick; 0 otherwise

VISION

Determines how far a donor looks for recipients
Table 1: Summary of Status Variables
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Depending on the values of active, match, and recruit, agents assume one of the six
aforementioned agent types. For example, an agent with the combination (-1, 1, 0) would be a
“post-recipient.” Finally, for the market models, variables defining money (cash, trycash) and
utility or satisfaction (util, tryutil) are used to assist with the auction process.
Initiation
For each model, the world is initiated in similar manners, the exceptions being the
variables unique to the market models. Each agent is given organtype and viability values, and
then the following occurs. First, 80 percent of agents are selected at random. If their viability
value is above 50, these selected agents begin the simulation as donors. Next, all agents not
selected as donors are collected, and a uniformly random value is generated between 0 and 100
for each of these agents; if this value is less than a predetermined value that reflects the
percentage of recipients desired, a uniformly random value called survive is assigned to the
agent. The agent then begins the simulation as a recipient. All other agents are given a survive
value of 0, and the remaining agents that have not been assigned a role are designated as
potential donors. After this occurs, a random value is assigned as the vision of all agents.
At this point, a world of agents seeking to donate or receive organs is created. While this
world is quite simplified compared to reality, it nevertheless exhibits qualities and quantities that
are relevant to organ allocation and avoid computationally complex operations, which are
desired properties in an ABM. Now the mechanisms of organ allocation itself within the models
may be explained.
Allocation of Organs
Now that agents exist in my generated world, they need procedures to interact with each
other. The following paragraphs summarize the algorithms used to run the models.
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General Procedures
Each model has three main stages. First, they are initialized as described above. Then, a
tick occurs, wherein three procedures occur. Finally, a check is made to see if the model should
continue running.
The three procedures that occur during a tick of time each complete a distinct set of tasks.
First, there is a check for survival of recipients and post-recipients which is determined by
survive and viability. For recipients, if the number of ticks that has occurred is equal to his or her
survive value, a random number between 0 and 100 is chosen; if their viability value is less than
this value, they become deceased. In a sense, survive acts as a “life expectancy,” with death
being impossible prior to reaching that tick value. Similarly, for post-recipients, a random
number between 0 and 100 is chosen; if their viability value is less than this value, they also
become deceased. The check for post-recipients occurs only once after the tick in which they
received an organ and reflects the chance for the transplant to fail.
Secondly, there is a check for recruitment of potential donors. A subset of potential
donors is selected, and if they meet the minimum viability threshold (50 or greater), they become
active donors. Otherwise, a potential donor remains as a potential donor. Third, there is the
process of finding a match. This varies with each model and is therefore defined for each below.
Matching Outside of a Market
The first model is distinct from the market models due to its lack of a market. In
particular, the first model seeks to resemble the current system to an extreme degree. One may
describe this model as the “benevolent dictator” model due to its matchmaking procedure, as
described below.
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In the “dictator” model, a master list of living recipients is generated. Each donor then
refines the list based upon his or her organtype value and sorts by the difference between the
survive value of a recipient and the current amount of ticks that have occurred. Agents outside
the range of the donor’s vision are then excluded. This results in a list of compatible recipients
near the donor with those who have the least amount of time remaining to find a match at the top.
The donor in question then is forced to match with this recipient, and the organ is “exchanged”
(i.e. the donor becomes a post-donor, and the recipient, a post-recipient). In reality, donors are
not compelled to follow through if a match is made, so the “dictator” reflects the best-case
scenario of the current system. Specifically, if all donors did follow through with their donation
pledge, the “benevolent dictator” model would be quite close to the actual organ allocation
system!
Matching in a Market
My goal in pursuing this project was to compare the current donation system to a marketbased system. As discussed before, I decided that two donor types could arise: “selfish” donors
who care only about money, and “selfless” donors who seek to maximize their amount of wealth
but qualify this desire with a check for the expected survival of a recipient. Both types of donors
perform auctions in a similar manner, but the conditions for accepting a bid are different.
For “selfish” donors, a list is created as in the “dictator” model, except it is not ordered
by survive. Instead, each recipient reports to the donor the value of their wealth multiplied by the
ratio between the current tick count and their survive value (or their entire wealth otherwise); this
is the “bid” of the recipient. The donor checks all bids and accepts the highest bid, whereupon
the organ is exchanged for the bid amount.
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Meanwhile, for “selfless” donors, the same process occurs, except the donor compares
his cash amount before a potential exchange to the product of his cash amount after a potential
exchange and the value of the recipient’s viability divided by 100. In mathematical terms, the
exchange is made if
𝑣𝑣

𝑟𝑟
(𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑 + 𝐵𝐵𝑟𝑟 ) 100
≥ 𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑

where 𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑 represents the cash amount of the donor d, 𝐵𝐵𝑟𝑟 represents the bid of a recipient r, and 𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟

denotes the viability value of recipient r. This means that a “selfless” donor may decide not to

donate unless the bid and probability of survival are sufficiently large enough to exceed the value
of the cash the donor currently has.
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Evaluation of Models’ Effectiveness
An evaluation of the models finds that, while the procedures differ between them, they
appear to behave similarly. Similar counts of donations and deaths occur in all three models,
which seems to suggest that a “benevolent dictator” is just as effective as a market of “selfish”
donors or a market of “selfless” donors. These results are consistent when varying the parameters
that initialize each of the models.
The interpretation of these results should be made carefully, however. While one could
argue that allowing individuals to sell their organs would not cause additional deaths based upon
the models, one should recall that the models do not consider several relevant factors when
deciding on organ allocation such as the ethical issues of selling organs, combinations of
“selfish” and “selfless” donors, or the switching costs associated with converting from one
system to the other.
Meanwhile, I am overall satisfied with the models as-is, but I feel that more can be done
to investigate the market types. For instance, my models don’t allow new recipients to spawn;
the recipients that are present at the beginning of the simulation are the only recipients to ever
exist in the simulation. Furthermore, the bidding process is somewhat simplified and doesn’t
consider other factors that could affect the amount a recipient would set aside for bidding. My
two market models separate “selfish” and “selfless” donors; if time permitted, I would have
created a “hybrid” market simulation with varying amounts of each type of donor. Finally, other
attributes of organ allocation, such as preservation times, operation costs, and “cold feet” from
donors aren’t considered in my models. Nevertheless, I learned a considerable amount about
agent-based modeling by undertaking this project, and additionally, I became more aware of the
attributes of the organ donation system that exists in the United States today.
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Conclusion
Would market-based allocation of organs improve outcomes for recipients? Based upon
my models, no meaningful answer can be confidently given for this question. That being said,
my primary goal, to conceptualize, create, and observe agent-based models that simulate organ
allocation was largely successful.
In the future, I intend to further investigate the effects of organ allocation, but I will also
consider ABMs of topics such as global trade, immigration, minimum wages, and other
economic phenomena. My experience with NetLogo acquired through this project will assist me
in these endeavors, and I gained meaningful insight in to the general process of creating a model
without any previous experience in doing so. Furthermore, I’ve seen examples of other models at
work while participating in ECN 499 that have inspired me to ask new questions in the context
of ABMs.
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Appendix A: Code for “Dictator” Model
globals[needorgan donations deaths recruitments reciplist seed]
patches-own[organtype recruit match partner active survive viability cooldown vision]
to setup
clear-all
set needorgan 1
set donations 0
set deaths 0
set recruitments 0
set reciplist []
init-patches
set-reciplist
reset-ticks
end

to go
if(needorgan = 0)[STOP]
check-survive
check-recruit
find-match
tick
end
to init-patches
ask patches[
set organtype random ORGCOUNT
set match 0
set viability init-viability
set recruit ifelse-value(random 100 < 80 and viability >= 50)[1][0]
set survive init-survive
set active ifelse-value(survive > 0)[1][0]
set pcolor init-pcolor
set cooldown 0
set vision random VIZ
]
end
to set-reciplist
set reciplist sort-on [survive] patches with [pcolor = red]
end
to-report get-mylist [o]
let ml []
let neighborhood patches in-radius vision
foreach reciplist[
x -> ask x[
if (organtype = o and member? self neighborhood)[
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set ml fput x ml
]
]
]
report ml
end
to-report init-survive
ifelse(recruit = 1)[report 0]
[
ifelse(random 100 < RECIPSPAWN)[report random RECIPEXP + 1][report 0]
]
end
to-report init-viability
let v 0
set v random-normal VMEAN VSTD
if (v < 0) [set v 0]
if (v > 100) [set v 100]
report precision v 2
end
to-report init-pcolor
ifelse(recruit = 1)[
ifelse(random 100 < DONORSPAWN)[set active 1
report green]
[report yellow]
]
[
ifelse(active = 1)[report red][report yellow]
]
end
to check-survive
let recips patches with [pcolor = red]
let postrecips patches with [pcolor = orange]
ask recips [
if(ticks > survive)[
set pcolor black
set active -1
set deaths deaths + 1
]
]
ask postrecips [
if (cooldown = 1)[
ifelse (random 100 > viability)[
set pcolor black
set deaths deaths + 1
][set cooldown 0]
]
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]
set needorgan check-need
end
to-report check-need
ifelse(count patches with[pcolor = red] = 0)[report 0][report 1]
end
to check-recruit
let recruits patches with [pcolor = yellow]
ask recruits [
if(viability > 50)[
set recruit 1
set pcolor init-pcolor
]
]
end
to find-match
let donors patches with [pcolor = green]
ask donors[
if (not empty? reciplist)[
let mylist get-mylist organtype
if (not empty? mylist)[
set match 1
set partner first mylist
set pcolor blue
set active -1
set donations donations + 1
ask partner[
set match 1
set partner myself
set pcolor orange
set active -1
set cooldown 1
]
]
set-reciplist
]
]
end
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Appendix B: Code for “Selfless Donors” Model
globals[needorgan donations deaths recruitments money]
patches-own[organtype recruit match partner active survive viability cooldown vision cash trycash util tryutil]
to setup
clear-all
reset-ticks
set needorgan 1
set donations 0
set deaths 0
set recruitments 0
init-patches
end
to go
if(needorgan = 0)[STOP]
check-survive
check-recruit
find-match
tick
end
to init-patches
ask patches[
set organtype random ORGCOUNT
set match 0
set viability init-viability
set recruit ifelse-value(random 100 < 80 and viability >= 50)[1][0]
set survive init-survive
set active ifelse-value(survive > 0)[1][0]
set pcolor init-pcolor
set cooldown 0
set vision random VIZ
set cash random ENDOWMENT
set trycash 0
set util init-util
set tryutil 0
]
end
to-report init-survive
ifelse(recruit = 1)[report 0]
[
ifelse(random 100 < RECIPSPAWN)[report random RECIPEXP + 1][report 0]
]
end
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to-report init-viability
let v 0
set v random-normal VMEAN VSTD
if (v < 0) [set v 0]
if (v > 100) [set v 100]
report precision v 2
end
to-report init-pcolor
ifelse(recruit = 1)[
ifelse(random 100 < DONORSPAWN)[set active 1
report green]
[report yellow]
]
[
ifelse(active = 1)[report red][report yellow]
]
end
to-report init-util
ifelse (pcolor = red)[
report (survive - ticks) * cash
][
report cash
]
end
to check-survive
let recips patches with [pcolor = red]
let postrecips patches with [pcolor = orange]
ask recips [
if(ticks > survive)[
set pcolor black
set active -1
set deaths deaths + 1
]
]
ask postrecips [
if (cooldown = 1)[
ifelse (random 100 > viability)[
set pcolor black
set deaths deaths + 1
][set cooldown 0]
]
]
set needorgan check-need
end
to-report check-need
ifelse(count patches with[pcolor = red] = 0)[report 0][report 1]
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end
to check-recruit
let recruits patches with [pcolor = yellow]
ask recruits[
if(viability > 50)[
set recruit 1
set pcolor init-pcolor
]
]
end
to find-match
let donors patches with [pcolor = green]
ask donors[
let recips patches with [pcolor = red and organtype = [organtype] of myself]
let myrecips recips in-radius vision
if any? myrecips[
let prtnr nobody
foreach [self] of myrecips[
x ->
set trycash cash + (ticks / [survive] of x) * [cash] of x
set tryutil trycash * ([viability] of x) / 100
if (tryutil > util)[set prtnr x]
]
if (prtnr != nobody)[set-match prtnr]
]
]
end
to set-match [p]
set match 1
set partner p
set pcolor blue
set active -1
set cash trycash
set util tryutil
set money money + (trycash - cash)
set donations donations + 1
ask partner [
set match 1
set partner myself
set pcolor orange
set active -1
set cash (1 - ticks / survive) * cash
set util survive * cash
set cooldown 1
]
end
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Appendix C: Code for “Selfish Donors” Model
globals[needorgan donations deaths recruitments money]
patches-own[organtype recruit match partner active survive viability cooldown vision cash trycash util tryutil]
to setup
clear-all
reset-ticks
set needorgan 1
set donations 0
set deaths 0
set recruitments 0
init-patches
end
to go
if(needorgan = 0)[STOP]
check-survive
check-recruit
find-match
tick
end
to init-patches
ask patches[
set organtype random ORGCOUNT
set match 0
set viability init-viability
set recruit ifelse-value(random 100 < 80 and viability >= 50)[1][0]
set survive init-survive
set active ifelse-value(survive > 0)[1][0]
set pcolor init-pcolor
set cooldown 0
set vision random VIZ
set cash random ENDOWMENT
set trycash 0
set util init-util
set tryutil 0
]
end
to-report init-survive
ifelse(recruit = 1)[report 0]
[
ifelse(random 100 < RECIPSPAWN)[report random RECIPEXP + 1][report 0]
]
end
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to-report init-viability
let v 0
set v random-normal VMEAN VSTD
if (v < 0) [set v 0]
if (v > 100) [set v 100]
report precision v 2
end
to-report init-pcolor
ifelse(recruit = 1)[
ifelse(random 100 < DONORSPAWN)[set active 1
report green]
[report yellow]
]
[
ifelse(active = 1)[report red][report yellow]
]
end
to-report init-util
ifelse (pcolor = red)[
report (survive - ticks) * cash
][
report cash
]
end
to check-survive
let recips patches with [pcolor = red]
let postrecips patches with [pcolor = orange]
ask recips [
if(ticks > survive)[
if(random 100 + 1 > viability)[
set pcolor black
set active -1
set deaths deaths + 1
]
]
]
ask postrecips [
if (cooldown = 1)[
ifelse (random 100 > viability)[
set pcolor black
set active -1
set deaths deaths + 1
][set cooldown 0]
]
]
set needorgan check-need
end
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to-report check-need
ifelse(count patches with[pcolor = red] = 0)[report 0][report 1]
end
to check-recruit
let recruits patches with [pcolor = yellow]
ask recruits[
if(viability > 50)[
set recruit 1
set pcolor init-pcolor
]
]
end
to find-match
let donors patches with [pcolor = green]
ask donors[
let recips patches with [pcolor = red and organtype = [organtype] of myself]
set trycash cash
let myrecips recips in-radius vision
if any? myrecips[
let prtnr nobody
foreach [self] of myrecips[
x ->
let bid min list (ticks / [survive] of x * [cash] of x) ([cash] of x)
if (cash + bid > trycash)[
set prtnr x
set trycash cash + bid
]
]
if (prtnr != nobody)[set-match prtnr]
]
]
end
to set-match [p]
let bid trycash - cash
set match 1
set partner p
set pcolor blue
set active -1
set money money + bid
set cash cash + bid
set donations donations + 1
ask partner [
set match 1
set partner myself
set pcolor orange
set active -1
set cash cash - bid
set cooldown 1
]
end

